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Abstract— The growing appreciation of the global environmental crisis has
generated what should have been a predictable response: those with power are using it
to  appropriate  for  themselves  the  world’s  diminishing  resources,  augmenting  their
power to do so while further undermining the power of the weak to oppose them. In
taking this path, they are at the same time blocking efforts to create forms of society
that would be ecologically sustainable. If there is one word that could bring into focus
what is wrong with this response it  is ‘democracy’.  Democracy means power  in the
hands of the  people,  which,  by  definition,  means opposition to  the  concentration of
power. It is inconceivable that if we had genuine democracy, where people were fully
informed of the issues,  they would not choose to share the  burdens of scarcity  and
organize to live in accordance with the limits of their environment.  Yet the notion of
democracy is problematic. Those striving to concentrate power are pursuing this in the
name of democracy. They have identified democracy with the imposition of free markets
and the freedom of people to use their wealth to dominate others. In this paper I will
show how process philosophy provides the basis for justifying and further developing the
traditional notion of democracy to counter this reformed notion, providing a vision of a
democratic form of society that could address environmental problems. To achieve this,
I will argue, it is necessary to reformulate the grand narrative of civilization on the basis
of human ecology,  a  science which,  construing humans as participants in a  creative
nature, can replace economics as the master science for formulating public policy.
Key  words—Environment,  democracy,  neo-liberalism,  neo-conservativism,  liberal
fascism,  economics,  freedom,  culture,  Hobbes,  Castoriadis,  Montesquieu,  Fichte,
Schelling, Herder, Hegel, John Stuart Mill, grand narrative, human ecology.
Introduction: Environmental Destruction and Neo-Liberalism
Each year the Worldwatch Institute publishes a book, State of the World, which sums up the latest
research on environmental problems and the attempts to address them. While these books indicate
some  achievements,  overall  it  is  clear  that  environmental  problems  are  not  being  effectively
addressed and the threat they pose to the future of humanity is increasing. In fact, as Joel Kovel has
pointed out, in the thirty years since environmental issues became a significant political issue, the
rate of global environmental destruction has accelerated. As he noted:
human population had inceased from 3.7 billion to 6 billion;
oil consumption had increased from 46 billion barrels a day to 73 billion;
natural gas extraction had increased from 34 trillion cubic feet per year to 95 trillion;
coal extraction had gone from 2.2 billion metric tonnes to 3.8 billion;
the global motor vehicle population had almost tripled, from 246 million to 730 million;
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air traffic had increased by a factor of six;
the rate at which trees are consumed to make paper had doubled, to 200 million metric tons;
human carbon emissions had increased from 3.9 million metric tons annually to an estimated
6.4 million …
fish were being taken at twice the rate as in 1970;
half of the forests had disappeared;
half of the wetlands had been filled or drained… (Kovel, 2002: 3f.).
Indicating just how dramatic are the changes being wrought, in the summer of 2000 the North Pole
melted  for  the  first  time  in  50  million  years.  Yet  as  far  as  the  general  public  is  concerned,
environmental  problems  are  of  decreasing  significance.  People  are  less  concerned  about  the
environment than they were in 1990.
This does not mean that governments are ignoring environmental issues.  In fact,  much of recent
international  and  domestic  politics  becomes  more  intelligible  against  the  background  of  global
environmental problems. Most obviously, increasing tensions around the world centre on the quest to
control resources; most importantly, oil. Domestic politics also becomes more intelligible if we take
into account imminent scarcities.  Governments are pursuing policies which are simply  cutting out
increasing  proportions  of  their  populations  from  participation  in  the  benefits  of  the  economy,
concentrating wealth while  radically  curtailing civil  liberties and increasing government powers to
coerce their populations.
In my view, the best way to comprehend the global situation is through the historical materialist
approach of Stephen Bunker and his colleagues (Bunker, 1988). Bunker pointed out the difference
between economies of the core zones of the world economy based on production of goods and those
in the semi-periphery and periphery based on the extraction of resources to trade for such goods.
Extractive  economies,  as they  ‘develop’,  use  up their  reserves and are  impoverished,  while  the
productive economies of the core  zones,  as they develop,  increase their  power  to dominate and
exploit  the  extractive  economies.  Bunker  showed in  detail  the  destructive  effects  on peripheral
regions such as the Amazon basin of the international economy, how:
Once  the  profit-maximizing  logic  of  extraction  for  trade  across  regional  ecosystems  is
introduced ... price differentials between extractive commodities and the differential return to
extractive labor stimulate concentrated exploitation of a limited number of resources at rates
which disrupt both the regeneration of these resources and the biotic chains of co-evolved
species and associated geological and hydrological regimes. (p.47).
His study of the exploitation of Amazonia illustrated how the transferral of most of the usable energy
in  living  and  fossilised  plants  to  a  small  part  or  the  world  is  generating  ecologically  costly
over-exploitation of natural  resources and socially  costly  hypercoherence.  Hypercoherence  is the
state in which the ruling elites are so powerful that they have become impervious to the needs and
demands of those they dominate. Bunker argued that:
Hypercoherence ultimately  leads to ecological  and social  collapse as increasingly  stratified
systems undermine  their  own resource  base.  ...  The  exchange  relations  which bind  this
system together depend on locally dominant groups to reorganize local modes of production
and extraction in response to world demand, but the ultimate collapse will be global, not local.
The  continued  impoverishment  of  peripheral  regions  finally  damages  the  entire  system.
(p.253).
A new phase in this whole process is emerging in which USA has attained total military ascendency in
the global arena, and the power elite that has gained control of its political institutions and mass
media, is moving to ensure that this domination remains permanent (Donnelly, 2000; Research Unit,
2002). USA is to become the new Roman Empire and those within USA who oppose this policy are to
be declared unpatriotic and deprived of their civil rights, while governments outside USA are to be
constrained or coerced to act in the interests of this Empire (Johnson, 2004). The new transnational
capitalist class has allied itself with this US power elite, with its members acting as a fifth column in
countries other than USA (Sklair,  2000). Through control of the mass media,  this power elite has
deceived the  general  public not only  about its goals,  but also about the  dire  state  of the  global
environment (Rowell, 1996).
Domination as the Imposition of Freedom and Democracy
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The intensification of exploitation of the peripheries by the new elite  is characterized as the war
against  terrorism  in  the  defence  of  freedom  and  democracy.  It  is  the  notions  of  freedom  and
democracy that are crucial here. Nobody could object to the defence of freedom and democracy. Most
environmentalists see themselves as fighting for freedom and democracy. However, these terms are
being given a particular interpretation. In the name of freedom, people in USA are being stripped of
the  civil  liberties  by  the  Patriot  Act  and  the  proposed  Domestic  Security  Enhancement  Act.
International law is being contravened. The military in Turkey was criticised by US Deputy Secretary
of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, because it did not intervene to prevent Turkey’s parliament bowing to
pressure from 95% of its population and refusing to allow USA to use it as a base to launch an
invasion of Iraq (Leicht, 2003). The defence of freedom and democracy is apparently consistent with
the support for,  and possibly the orchestration of,  an attempted coup to overthrow the popularly
elected president of Venezuela. Clearly, the notions of freedom and democracy are being used in a
new way.
Freedom is equated with the imposition of the market throughout the world to mediate all aspects of
economic, social and political life. Electoral systems have been reconceived on market principles as
political parties competing with each other to sell packages of promises to their electorates for votes,
with the victors being rewarded with the perquisites of office (Downs, 1957; Macpherson, 1977: ch.4).
The imposition of the market itself would facilitate increasing concentrations of wealth and power. As
Brian Arthur  has  shown,  markets  are  characterized  by  a  tendency  not  towards  equilibrium  but
towards increasing returns, for the economically powerful to become more powerful (Arthur, 1994),
whether they be companies, individuals or regions. In the global system, the free market is really a
machine of the core zones of the world economy to suck out the natural and social wealth of weaker
countries while undermining the power of the working class in the core zones. However, the new
notion of freedom goes beyond working within deregulated markets. Democracy is equated with the
subordination of public life to the market, liberating people’s power to use what money and property
they have to buy and sell on the new, free, global market and to use their wealth to dominate the
political arena. It is the freedom of those who have the most wealth to dominate politics through
financing political campaigns and controlling people’s beliefs through public relations and ownership
and domination of the mass media,  to put in power governments who will  privatise the people’s
assets, reduce taxes on business and the wealthy, manipulate markets and force down wages and
salaries and the costs of raw materials, thereby further increasing the power of the wealthy. It is the
freedom to use instruments of the State, including the military, to effect regime changes in weaker
countries that, in the interests of their own people have resisted the operation of the free market. It
is the freedom of the powerful to dominate the weak and control the world’s resources.
Deploying the notions of freedom and democracy to characterize what appears to be a drive to create
a global police state is not just a cynical manipulation of terms, as in George Orwell’s 1984 where the
Ministry of War is called the Ministry of Peace.  This reformulation of the notions of freedom and
democracy has solid intellectual foundations. Ultimately, it is grounded in the philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes. By construing humans as complex machines in a mechanical world,  Hobbes provided the
basic concepts on which economic theory, Darwinian evolutionary theory and Social Darwinism were
eventually developed (Gare, 1996, ch.6). For Hobbes, freedom is to be moved by internal motions
rather than external motions; it is the freedom from constraints to satisfy one’s appetites and to
avoid that to which one is averse, most importantly, death. Ultimately, it is to have the whole world
fear and obey one. Everything that humans produce is construed as nothing but instruments to further
these ends. Language is an instrument which has been developed to facilitate control of the world.
Society and government are established by contract to further egoistic ends, providing more freedom
for individuals to dominate the world than would be possible in a state of nature. Within the social
body  created by  this contract,  egoism drives the  circulation of money  and goods to  provide  its
components with the  necessary  nutrients.  The whole  science of economics is little  more than an
elaboration of chapter twenty-four of the Leviathan in which Hobbes put forward this idea,  and it
continues to  construe  humans as nothing but complex  machines,  as Philip Mirowski  has recently
shown (Mirowski, 2002).
Hobbes himself was an opponent of democracy. From an Aristotlean perspective, he was a defender
of an enlightened form of tyranny presiding over a society dominated by the vice of acquisitiveness
(pleonexia).  However,  as the  intellectual  movement he  inspired evolved,  political  concepts were
redefined to present Hobbesian assumptions as aligned with democracy. Locke reformulated Hobbes’
ideas to justify rebellion against tyranny, but he was a defender of the rights of property owners to
unlimited accumulation of property  rather  than a  defender  of democracy  (Locke,  II,  3; II,  135;
Macpherson,  1962: ch.5).  Before the nineteenth century those who defended democracy,  such as
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Rousseau and Jefferson, were not Hobbesians (and in the nineteenth century the Democratic Party
inspired  by  Jefferson  became  the  party  of  the  slave-owning  class).  Those  working  within  the
Hobbesian tradition first defended an attenuated notion of democracy in the early nineteenth century.
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill,  utilitarian proponents of the free market on the grounds that it
would lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number, defended the extension of the franchise
as a means to limit government oppression.  A more robust defence of democracy was made by
James Mill’s son, John Stuart Mill, who, influenced by Ancient Greek and Roman notions of politics and
German philosophy moral and political philosophy, defended representative government as a means
to promote public participation in shaping the future and thereby the development of people’s abilities
to be self-determining (Mill, 1912: ch.3 & Macpherson, 1977: ch.3). Mill’s writings had the effect of
making democracy respectable; so respectable that almost all subsequent political movements (with
fascism being the obvious exception) have claimed to be democratic.  However, Mill had departed
from Hobbesian assumptions and he became increasingly  critical  of the  market.  Appreciating the
incompatibility  this  ideal  of  democracy  with  the  selfishness  generated  by  the  market  and  the
reduction of people to mere labourers without job security, Mill called for workers’ cooperatives to
replace the existing relations of production.
Subsequent to Mill, there was continual tension between support for democracy and the Hobbesian
tradition of thought. The cooperatives Mill called for did not flourish and in the twentieth century it
became apparent that people were not actively participating in public life and were not developing
their abilities to do so. It also became apparent in the 1960s that if the form of democracy promoted
by Mill were cultivated, it could lead to conflict with the free operation of the market. The passivity of
the public and the effective control by competing power elites was then defended as a more stable
and efficient form of government than one in which the people  actively  participated,  first by the
Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, and then by Robert Dahl and other leading American political
scientists (Macpherson, 1973: essay iv).  Milton Friedman, another economist and a disciple of the
Austrian economist,  Friedrich von Hayek,  called  for  a  return to  the  nineteenth century  form  of
economic liberalism in his influential work Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman, 1963), arguing that to
maximise freedom, where-ever possible political direction should be determined by the free operation
of the  market.  These  ideas were  presented not as an attack  on democracy  but in the  name of
democracy. Political scientists, embracing the Hobbesian notions elaborated within economic theory,
went on to elaborate  ‘rational  choice  theory’,  equating all  choice  based on rigorous egoism with
‘rationality’ (Ostrom, 1998). It was argued that this not only does but should underlie all political life
(Downs, 1957; Amadae, 2003). The neo-conservatives (or, more accurately, ‘liberal fascists[2]), who
have further developed these ideas,  appear to be influenced also by the émigré German political
philosopher (and advisor to Goering), Carl Schmitt, who argued that countries need enemies to define
and unite them (Schmitt, 1996)[3]  However, as a strategy, this is consistent with Hobbes’ political
philosophy.  Elaborating  these  ideas,  the  neo-conservatives  have  reformulated  the  concepts  of
freedom and democracy to accord with Hobbes’ original philosophy. Freedom is equated not only with
the imposition of market relationships and the freedom of choice this allows people to buy and sell on
the market; it is having the entire world fearing and obeying those who have prevailed within the
world market. Democracy is then the freedom of the winners in the struggle for wealth to use it to
augment their wealth.
The Origins of Democracy and Process Metaphysics
But do we have to accept this characterization of democracy? It is important to emphasise that the
notion of democracy had its origins in a different tradition of thought than Hobbes’ philosophy and
economic liberalism. It was based on a different notion of freedom, that of autonomy, the freedom of
a  community  to  prescribe  its  own laws and to  determine  its  own future.  Such a  community  is
democratic when all its members are involved equally in formulating its laws and making decisions
affecting the whole community. Democracy means power in the hands of the people. Such a notion is
by definition inconsistent with concentrations of power, and since wealth is power, it is inconsistent
with concentrations of wealth. This notion is still alive and is central to the growing opposition to the
new global power elite. The proponents of the traditional notion of democracy believe that if power
were decentralized,  if people generally  were in control of their  own destinies,  they would not be
destroying their environment. This appears plausible. But what does it mean to invoke democracy in
this  way?  What  content  can  be  given to  the  notion  of  democracy  in  a  world  system  in  which
environmental  problems  transcend  national  boundaries?  How  would  it  function  and  how  would
environmental  problems  be  addressed?  More  fundamentally,  how  can  the  traditional  notion  of
democracy be defended when the notions of free agency it presupposes has been invalidated by
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advances in the sciences that, in general, have upheld the Hobbesian notion of humans as complex
machines moved by appetites and aversions?
To answer such questions it is necessary to examine again this traditional notion of democracy. One
way of approaching this task would be to examine ideas of representative democracy and efforts to
refurbish it. This would highlight both the difficulties of upholding such a notion philosophically and the
practical problems of realizing it. However, since this modern notion of democracy is a compromise
with prevailing philosophies and circumstances, it makes more sense to look at the original notion of
democracy  and then show how it  has been modified and adapted to  the  modern era.  Following
Cornelius  Castoriadis,  I  will  argue  that  democracy  and  philosophy  are  indissociable,  and  that
democracy  as  the  notion was developed by  the  Ancient  Greeks requires some  form  of  process
metaphysics to justify it. Against this background it can be seen how antithetical to democracy is the
Hobbesian tradition of thought. I will then identify and show the evolution of ideas that developed in
opposition  to  Hobbesian  thought.  This,  I  will  argue,  is  essentially  the  tradition  that  led  to  the
development of process philosophy. This tradition, I will argue, provides the basis of clarifying and
upholding the notion of democracy, but also shows the need for a post-Hobbesian science of humanity
as a reference point for reformulating public policies.
Castoriadis’ study of the emergence of democracy in the Ancient Greek polis is framed through a
version of process philosophy. Castoriadis was himself a process philosopher, and his work shows how
it  is  only  through process philosophy  that  the  achievement  of  the  Ancient  Greeks in creating a
democratic society can be fully understood. Castoriadis’ analysis begins with a set of presuppositions,
that nature is temporal and ‘[t]ime is creation and destruction’ (Castoriadis, 1997: 399), and that:
History is creation: the creation of total forms of human life. Social-historical forms are not
‘determined’ by natural or historical ‘laws.’ Society is self-creation. … The self-institution of
society is the creation of a human world: of ‘things,’ ‘reality,’ language, norms, values, ways
of life and death, objects for which we live and objects for which we die – and of course, first
and foremost,  the  creation of  the  human individual  in  which the  institution of  society  is
massively embedded (Castoriadis, 1991, p.84).
He then goes on to point out that: ‘It is precisely because history is creation that the question of
judging and choosing emerges as a radical, nontrivial question’ (ibid. p.87). However, almost every
society in history has avoided this question, ascribing their particular institutions to something other
than themselves, to their ancestors, to the gods or God or to the laws of history. In Ancient Greece,
by contrast, people came to appreciate that they were the creators of their own institutions.
It  was the  community  of citizens who proclaimed themselves as self-legislating,  self-judging and
self-governing. Equality of citizens meant their active involvement in public affairs. Citizens not only
had the right to speak and to vote, they were under an obligation to speak their minds. A political
space was created which upheld the common good.  Democracy was above all  public deliberation
about the common good and collective goals. The only time when people were excluded from voting
was when their particular interests were involved. This political space entailed the creation of a public
space which maintained the conditions for democracy. People freely discussed politics and everything
they  cared  about  in  the  agora  (the  place  of  assembly)  before  deliberating  in  the  ecclesia  (the
assembly). There was free speech, free thinking, free examination and questioning without restraint.
Participation in the public space required courage, responsibility and shame. And it required education
for people to become citizens to give substantive content to this public space. Education (paedia) first
and foremost ‘involves becoming conscious that the polis is also oneself and that its fate also depends
upon one’s mind, behaviour, and decisions; in other words, it is participation in political life’ (ibid.:
113). In turn, this public space created a public time, including writing publicly accessible histories of
the people ‘leading up to the present and clearly pointing toward new things to be done in the future’
(ibid.:  114) and the  production and public performance  of plays.  Democracy  was the  regime  of
self-limitation; the failure of self-limitation was hubris (ibid.: 115). Greek tragic drama was a warning
against hubris and one-sided reasoning.
Greek  politics and philosophy  emerged together  with democracy.  Here  we  find people  explicitly
deliberating about the laws and changing those laws. This led to questions such as what is it for a law
to be right or wrong, that is, what is justice? Here also we find people for the first time explicitly
questioning the  instituted collective  representation of the  world and proposing alternatives.  They
quickly moved from questions about whether some representations of the world are true to what is
truth. The conceptions of the world developed by these early Greek thinkers gave a place to their own
creative  activity.  It  was  a  self-organizing  world  in  which  order  emerged  from  chaos.  For
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Anaximander, the earliest Greek philosopher of whose ideas we have good knowledge and the point
of departure for all subsequent Greek philosophy (Kahn, 1994: 6), the primary element of being is the
indeterminate or the boundless. Form, the determinate existence of various beings, emerges through
injustice,  requiring such forms to  render  justice  to  one  another  and pay  compensation for  their
injustice through their decay and disappearance. In this way, cosmos emerges from and decays back
into the chaos. There is never complete order; chaos reigns supreme. Human society is a struggle for
further order. In the scheme of early Greek cosmology there was an implicit connection between the
oppositions: chaos and cosmos, physis and nomos (i.e. nature and custom or law) and hubris and
justice. In each, the second functions to limit the first. Politics and philosophy are possible because the
world is not completely ordered; cosmos has not completely eliminated chaos. If the world were fully
ordered, by the gods, by the nature of society or the laws of history, there would be no place for
political, instituting action. And if there were full and certain knowledge of the human domain, then
democracy would be absurd.  As Castoriadis argued: ‘democracy implies that all  citizens have the
possibility of attaining a correct doxa and that nobody possesses an episteme of things political’ (ibid.:
104).
Castoriadis notes that Plato, and to a lesser extent Aristotle, were opponents of democracy, although
their  work  was  only  made  possible  through  the  traditions  of  questioning  developed  within  a
democratic  society.  Consequently,  they  provide  a  distorted  picture  of  democratic  life  as  it  had
developed in Athens over three hundred years. However, these philosophers were responding to the
failure of democracy during the Peloponnesian War,  and both Plato and Aristotle made important
contributions to analysing what is involved in political discussion and debate. Plato portrayed a new
kind of dispassionate, open-minded pursuit of the truth through dialogue, while Aristotle argued that
unless people have a shared set of basic principles, their deliberations and inquiries are unlikely to
lead anywhere. In politics the most fundamental question that must addressed is: What is a good life?
When we have accepted an answer to this question we can consider what kind of constitution will
enable people to live the good life.  In considering constitutions, Aristotle identified six basic kinds
according to first, whether one, some or the many rule, and secondly, according to whether those
who rule do so for the common interest or their own interest (Aristotle: bk III, ch.7). Constitutions
dominated by self-interest were portrayed as perverted forms of the true forms, those concerned
with  the  common good  and  constituted  in  accordance  with  strict  principles  of  justice.  Within  a
particular constitution it is then possible to deliberate on specific issues. Working out what is the good
life requires ideas about and principles for investigating what is human life and what is life in general,
while these are based on more basic notions of what is primary being and how this question should be
answered, that is, metaphysics. Aristotle clarified the indissociability of philosophy and politics and the
relationship between metaphysics and political issues.
The Failure to Reconstitute Democracy in Modernity
Against this background it  should be  evident how alien is the  modern world to democracy in its
original  sense.  To  begin  with,  there  is  the  problem  with  the  market.  An  unfettered  market
concentrates wealth and undermines people’s economic security,  forcing them into a  competitive
struggle that leaves no time for participation in public life. Without control of the market and with the
selfishness it generates there can be no democracy. Secondly, there are problems of scale. It is for
this reason that notions of representation become imperative. It should be noted that for the Greeks
who invented elections, the elevation of people to positions of power in this way is not democracy but
a  form  of  aristocracy  or  monarchy.  At  best,  what  we  have  are  mixed  constitutions  combining
elements of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. As we have seen, John Stuart Mill believed that
the important elements of Ancient Greek democracy could be carried over into the modern world
through representative government. He and those who advanced his ideas promised ‘first, political
participation, or general involvement mediated by representatives in decisions affecting the whole
community; secondly, accountable government; and thirdly, freedom to protest and reform’ (Held,
1995, p.13) While there were grounds for hope that these promises might be fulfilled, it is now clear
that liberal democracy has failed to deliver on any of these promises. One reason should now be
evident:  the  metaphysics  underlying  the  Hobbesian  tradition  of  thought,  the  metaphysics  still
presupposed and supported by the mainstream of science, undermines the basic premises on which
democracy was based.
Hobbes followed Aristotle in grounding his system of thought in metaphysics, and then redefined all
the  received notions of ethics and politics on the  assumption of a  mechanical  view of the  world
(Herbert, 1989). However, in the deterministic, block universe defended by Hobbes, there is no place
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for an autonomous society to participate in the determination of the future. If people are nothing but
mechanisms moved by appetites and aversions, there is no point in deliberating about the good life
and how to achieve it and then governing for the common good. In fact, Hobbes had characterized
language in a way that gave no place for such deliberation. Language, Hobbes argued, consists of
names coined to accumulate and convey knowledge on how to control the world and to enable people
to co-operate to achieve such control; most importantly, to make contracts and to ‘make known to
others our  wills’  (Hobbes,  1985: 102).  Other  language uses were  treated as mere amusements.
People’s appetites and aversions,  which,  Hobbes argued,  define what is good and evil,  are brute
givens (Hobbes, 1985: 216). Injustice is nothing more than breaking a covenant, an agreement or
contract  presupposing  a  coercive  power  to  enforce  it;  all  else  is  just.  Only  those  constitutions
characterized by Aristotle as perverted were conceivable from Hobbes’ perspective. There is no place
to  question the  justice  of  covenants or  the  domination of  one  society  by  another.  According to
Hobbes,  to claim laws are unjust means nothing more than to say one does not like them. Most
importantly,  aligning  himself  with  Galileo’s  methods,  Hobbes  claimed  an absolute  knowledge  of
political issues.  There was no requirement for a public sphere to promote questioning of received
ideas and institutions. Locke, Bentham and the political economists who developed these ideas into a
science  of society  were  all  elaborating these  ideas,  although with less consistency  than Hobbes.
Economic liberalism, upholding the primacy of the market and the subordination of society to the logic
of the market, with every important political decision on domestic issues being made by technically
trained economists or ‘rational choice’ theorists, is the logical outcome of this tradition.
So, is there a basis for reviving the ideal and practice of the traditional notion of democracy? John
Stuart Mill began his philosophising within the Hobbesian tradition, but, as noted, became increasingly
supportive of efforts to revive participatory democracy. At the same time he became increasingly
critical of his Hobbesian (and Benthamite) heritage and increasingly eclectic, drawing upon the ideas
of  Ancient  Greek  and  German  philosophers  and  the  Romantic  poets  influenced  by  them.  This
undermined the  coherence  of his philosophy.  As John Bowring wrote  at the  time,  Mill  had ‘read
Wordsworth, and that muddled him, and he has been in a strange confusion ever since …’ (Ryan,
1974: 48). While persuasive, Mill’s arguments did not have the force to displace Hobbesian thought.
Habermas’ more recent neo-Kantian effort to defend the role of the public sphere through discourse
ethics without confronting Hobbes’ metaphysics has been singularly ineffectual. His discourse ethics
provides no basis for considering political issues beyond promoting a place for unfettered discourse
and it provides no strategy for dealing with the forces of the globalised market. These ideas do not
provide an effective intellectual opposition to the neo-conservatives who, in Aristotelian terminology,
are  eliminating  this  democratic  component  of  modern  society  entirely  and  replacing  a  mix  of
aristocracy and monarchy (power elites concerned with the common good) by a mix of oligarchy and
tyranny (power elites governing for their own interests). My contention is that the traditional notion of
democracy can be defended both theoretically and practically, but to do so it is necessary to have
recourse to the tradition of thought that has challenged the basic assumptions of Hobbes’ philosophy.
The Defence of Free Agency and the Origins of Modern Process Metaphysics
The tradition of thought that developed in opposition to Hobbes began with the writings of Vico and
Montesquieu rejecting the Hobbesian conception of humans. Of the two, Montesquieu was far more
influential. There are two main components to his opposition to Hobbes. The first is his affirmation of
human freedom or liberty, which he conceived of not as acting according to impulse and doing what
one wishes but as ‘being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what
one ought not to will’ (Richter, 1977: 243; Montesquieu, 1989: 155). The second is his conception of
people as essentially social,  developing as individuals in the context of particular societies and his
appreciation of the diversity of these societies. The notion of human liberty as doing what one ought
to do, that is, as accepting limits on one’s actions, was taken up and developed first by Rousseau,
then following him, by Kant and Fichte. The second component of Montesquieu’s ideas was taken up
by Herder and developed through his conception of humans as essentially cultural, and his recognition
of a diversity of cultures (Berlin, 1980; Barnard, 1988; Beiser, 1992). Schelling and Hegel recombined
these ideas.
Kant’s whole philosophical system was devoted to justifying the notion of human freedom. However,
here I  will focus on the work of Fichte and Schelling.  Following Kant,  Fichte argued that freedom
requires a reflexivity or self-consciousness, but argued that Kant failed to adequately account for and
characterize this. He argued that the emergence of reflexivity comes about only when it is solicited by
another  free  agent (Fichte,  2000: 29ff.) The ‘I’  only  becomes self-authorizing through upbringing
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(education) and through acts of mutual recognition. People must be educated to be persons, but to
achieve this status they must also be recognized by others as free agents. Recognition of oneself as a
free agent can only be asked of someone who is treated as a free agent. The relation to others should
not be seen as a causal relation but a normative relation. When two agents mutually recognize each
other, each agent becomes for the other the normative ‘Not-I’ that serves to limit and constrain the
normative commitments the other undertakes. This conception of agency yields a basic principle of
‘right’ or primordial right to limit your freedom so that others around you can also be free (Fichte,
2000: 85). Fichte argued from this that it is necessary to go beyond ethics and to elaborate a political
philosophy. The State, he argued, should be construed as the institution that embodies the common
will and which has the power to judge its citizens and sanction them accordingly. It should be the
objective viewpoint with the power to observe the various branches of government and society to
ensure they comply with the basic principles of ‘right’.  Above all  else,  the State should recognize
people as free agents, and thereby facilitate their development as such. To achieve this, the State
should educate people and guarantee their economic security. The crucial points being made by Fichte
are that not only freedom but the very existence of a person derives from limits associated with
mutual recognition, and this underlies both his ethics and his political philosophy.
Fichte’s philosophy  was the  point of departure  for  Schelling,  originally  Fichte’s disciple.  Following
Hölderlin, Schelling concluded that Fichte still had not shown how self-consciousness was possible; to
do this it was necessary for people to presuppose a whole of which subjects and objects are parts
(Bowie, 1993: 46; Bowie, 2003: 103, 113). He attempted to formulate a conception of nature from
which both subjects and objects could emerge, thereby fulfilling this function, making intelligible the
possibility  of free  human agency  as Fichte  had conceived it  by  beings which had evolved within
nature.  In doing so  he  developed a  cosmology  surprisingly  similar  to  that  of  Anaximander  and
Heraclitus, although developed in much greater detail.  Schelling’s procedure was to subtract from
self-consciousness to arrive at the lowest conceivable potential, and then construct the path upward,
through a succession of limits, to show how the conscious self could emerge from this as its highest
potential (Schelling, 1994: 114ff.). The lowest potential arrived at was the ‘pure subject-object’, which
Schelling equated with nature, and, he claimed, the ‘unconscious’ stages through which consciousness
emerges can only  become conscious to  an ‘I’  which has developed out of them and realizes its
dependence upon them.  Nature  was conceived as essentially  self-limiting activity,  simultaneously
‘productivity’ (or process) and ‘products’. Insofar as nature is productivity, it is subject; insofar as it is
product, it is object. From opposed activities, that is, activities limiting each other, emerge force and
matter, space and time, chemicals and non-living and living organisms. Whatever product or form
exists is in perpetual process of forming itself by limiting itself.  The process of self-constitution or
self-organization, rather than being a marginal phenomenon, must be the primal ground of all reality
(Heuser-Kessler, 1986). Dead matter, in which product prevails over productivity, is a result of the
stable balance of forces where products have achieved a state of indifference. Living organisms differ
from non-living organisms in that their complexity makes it even more difficult to maintain a state of
indifference;  they  are  characterized  by  irritability.  They  must  respond  to  changes  in  their
environments creatively to form and reform themselves as products. The senses become an essential
component of such creative response. Sentient life is the condition for the emergence of spirit, with its
social forms and history. With spirit, we have intersubjectivity, the experience of world as objective,
and the emergence of freedom to choose evil or good. Evil is the domination of the blind self-seeking
urge. It is creative power out of control; but without such power there would be no existence and no
good. The potential for good comes with the self-consciousness that emerges with social relationships
that limit, and facilitate the self-limitation, of this creative power. Thus, by outlining a cosmology in
which the very existence of anything is self-organization through the limiting of activity, Schelling
provided a naturalistic justification for Fichte’s notion of freedom as self-limiting, and thereby Fichte’s
political philosophy.
Schelling upheld the value of historical narrative; it is only through such a narrative, Schelling held,
that it is possible to grasp the unconscious history through which the conscious ‘I’  moves towards
awareness of its freedom (Bowie, 1993: 47, 51).  The development of institutions is a part of this
narrative, extending from the first forms of human community to a projected future in which there
will be a federation of all States so that ‘the mutual quarrels between people can be referred to an
international  tribunal,  composed of members of all  civilized nations,  and having at its command
against each rebellious state-individual the power of the rest’ (Schelling, 1978: 198). How can this
brought about? As noted, for Schelling as for Fichte, free action is conceived as self-limiting activity in
which the  freedom of others is being recognized.  This brings into focus the process within which
people  are limiting their  activities in appreciation of the freedom of others.  Schelling gave some
indication of what this might entail in his philosophy of history. As he put it:
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[T]here can only be a history of such beings as have an ideal before them, which can never
be carried by the individual, but only by the species. And for this it is needful that every
succeeding individual should start in at the very point where the preceding one left off, and
thus that continuity should be possible between succeeding individuals, and, if that which is
to be realized in the progress of history is something attainable only through reason and
freedom, that there should also be the possibility of tradition and transmission (Schelling,
1978: 200).
The  focus here  is  on an action transcending  generations as  an historical  development.  History,
Schelling argued, is only possible where there is freedom, that is, where there is neither mechanical
determinism nor random chaos, where agents who are free nevertheless coordinate their activities to
realize ideals. History is a story, a story of what has been done in the past and what is aspired to in
the future. This story unfolds and is passed on and taken up by each new generation. It is a story
involving the free action of a multiplicity of individuals, yet that still moves towards the realization of
goals. In this way a multiplicity of free individuals can participate in projecting and realizing a global
system of justice  transcending and limiting each particular  State.  Schelling showed how science,
philosophy and art also have a place within this narrative, being not only as means to understand the
world,  but  activities  within  the  world  through  which  the  world  (the  absolute)  is  becoming
self-conscious.
Schelling’s work inspired Hegel who elaborated a theory of history and a political philosophy based on
the struggle for recognition in far greater detail than Fichte or Schelling, reformulating and, following
Schelling,  absorbing  Herder’s  ideas  on  cultural  diversity  of  nations  and  showing  how  different
institutions provided people with recognition and how these had developed through history (Williams,
1992, 1997). Hegel appreciated more clearly than Fichte or Schelling that the quest for recognition
provides the motivation for people to uphold and develop the institutions that accord recognition, and
to act ethically.  He appreciated the diversity of forms of recognition,  upholding the family as the
realm  of  love,  civil  society  as  the  realm  in which property  and  rights  are  recognised,  and  the
corporation and the State as realms in which solidarity between people is achieved (Honneth, 1996:
ch.5). In this way Hegel gave a place to the market based on egoistic relations, but required that it
be constrained within strict limits and ultimately subordinated to the State which, following Fichte,
Hegel held to be responsible for recognising the significance of each individual as a free agent and for
embodying their common will.  In developing these ideas,  Hegel abandoned Schelling’s naturalistic
standpoint, treating nature as something posited by Spirit. However, Schelling had already provided a
philosophy of nature through which Hegel’s ideas on humanity could be understood naturalistically.
Through  Schelling,  we  can  both  construe  humans,  their  cultures  and  institutions  as  emergent
phenomena, and appreciate that all such emergence involves limiting or constraining activity.
Following Schlegel’s precept that ‘[i]t is equally deadly for the spirit to have a system and not to have
a  system.  It  must  simply  resolve  to  combine  both’,  Schelling  overcame  Kant’s  strictures  on
metaphysics  and  developed  a  coherent  metaphysical  system  (Schelling,  2000:  xxiv).  Schelling
claimed  that  his  own philosophy  was  ‘neither  materialism  nor  spiritualism,  neither  realism  nor
idealism’ but contained within itself ‘the opposition of all earlier systems’ (1994, p.120). It was in fact,
a form of process philosophy (Orel, 2001; Gare, 2001; Gare, 2002a). In place of Hobbes’ dogmatic
metaphysics construing the world as mechanical matter in motion, Schelling’s metaphysical system
was open to revision and development, and provided a research progamme for reconstruing both
nature  and  humanity  as  creative  processes.  Schelling’s  philosophy  influenced  either  directly  or
indirectly  the  whole  tradition of anti-mechanistic natural  science (Esposito,  1977) and a range of
traditions in the human sciences and humanities, including hermeneutics, humanistic Marxism (White,
1996),  existentialism,  the  Bakhtin  circle  (Orel,  2001)  and  critical  theory  (Bowie,  1997).  It  also
influenced either directly or indirectly the philosophies of the process metaphysicians Peirce, Bergson,
Mead  and  Whitehead,  the  thinkers  whose  ideas  enable  anti-mechanistic  natural  science  and
anti-reductionist ideas in the human sciences and humanities to be integrated (with modifications)
into a coherent cosmology (Gare, 2002a). That is, Schelling and those who have followed him have
provided a philosophy that is successfully challenging in virtually every intellectual domain Hobbes’
core ideas, the ideas which had rendered the notion of democracy in its original sense unintelligible.
Process Metaphysics and the Quest for Democracy
Once the fruitfulness of this counter tradition of thought is appreciated, not just in parts but as a
whole, there do seem to be grounds for hope that democracy can be successfully revived and that
people  will  then be  able  to  address  the  problems of  environmental  destruction.  To  begin  with,
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conceiving nature to account for the emergence of humans as self-conscious, free agents involves a
radical elevation in the status of the rest of nature. Schelling reacted against the idea that nature as
merely there to serve human purposes (Bowie, 2003: 103). By conceiving it as self-organising with its
own  dynamics,  he  also  revealed  the  dangers  of  treating  nature  as  though  it  could  be  totally
dominated  by  humans,  and  by  conceiving  human  self-creation  as  self-limiting  on  the  basis  of
recognition of others, he upheld the basis for an ethics that could easily be extended to constraining
people’s actions towards the natural world. Proper recognition of others is essentially justice. This can
easily  be  extended  to  encompass  the  proper  recognition  of  and  thereby  doing  justice  to  the
significance and dynamics of non-human life forms (Gare, 1996: ch.16). The self-limitation required
for this is not counter to self-interest but is the condition of being a self, and limitation is no longer
conceived as ‘unnatural’ as it is in social Darwinism, but as a further development of the creative
advance of nature. This ethics is inseparable from political philosophy. It upholds the quest to create
and maintain institutions through which the freedom and significance of people are recognized as an
essential part of the struggle for recognition, and again this quest can easily be extended to properly
recognizing the  rest  of  nature.  That  is,  what  is  required is the  development  of  institutions that
properly recognize both human and non-human beings and processes in their practices and projects,
and the means to ensure that they continue to do so.  What is being suggested here is that such
requirements are most likely to be met when institutions are genuinely democratic, that is, where
power to determine the future is in the hands of the people educated, provided with the requisite
economic and political security and organized for this. While neither Fichte, Schelling nor Hegel were
defenders of democracy, their commitment to upholding the reality of human freedom lends itself to
defending the devolution of power into the hands of the people, a view that had been defended by
Herder and was defended by the majority of Hegel’s followers, ranging from liberal and left-Hegelians
(including  humanist  Marxists)  to  American  pragmatists  (Toews,  1980;  Barber,  1984).  With  such
self-determination being  conceived  as  self-limitation,  this  political  philosophy  also  lends  itself  to
addressing how societies should and can constrain their (and their members) activities to preserve
and enrich the environmental conditions for their continued existence.
However, relating such ideas to practice is more difficult. While process metaphysics could provide
the philosophical foundation for the traditional form of democracy as practiced in Ancient Greece, this
form only included the males of the ruling class of single cities living very similar lives.  Relations
beyond these cities were seen entirely in terms of power to subjugate or be subjugated. As we have
seen, efforts by those influenced by John Stuart Mill to resurrect the virtues associated with direct
democracy into the modern world based on representative government have largely failed (although
some countries, for instance Sweden, have been more successful than others). This has not only been
due  to  the  weakness  of  Mill’s  philosophical  arguments;  at  least  partly  it  has  been  due  to  the
intensifying dynamics of the market and increasing complexity  of society  in a world-system with
increasing  interaction  between  countries  and  regions  at  all  levels.  Mill  himself  later  came  to
appreciate that the ravages of the free market, including the concentration of wealth, the cultivation
of selfishness and the impoverishment of education, undermined the conditions for democracy; he
became increasingly sceptical about democracy and increasingly sympathetic to socialism (Mill, 1971:
138). To increase democratic control over society it is necessary to organize social life to not only
control the market but also to reduce this complexity. This could be achieved by organizing the world
into a hierarchically ordered federal structure decentralizing power as much as possible and reducing
economic interactions within this structure. That is, localities, countries and regions should aim for
economic self-sufficiency where possible in order to subordinate the market to democratic control, to
undermine  the  positive  feed-back  loops  identified  by  Bunker  and  Arthur  which  are  at  present
massively concentrating world-power, and thereby enable people to decide what kind of future they
want (Cavanagh, 2002: 107; Shiva, 2000: ch.7). Achieving such decentralization should involve at
least some direct democracy to cultivate the virtues required for any form of democracy to work
(Barber 1984). However, even if this were achieved, it would be necessary to have representative
democracy at some levels and to develop administrative structures of some kind (Bobbio, 1987). In
fact, in the modern world I believe democracy is only possible with the development of an open,
professional civil service such as has existed in Sweden committed to researching, articulating and
educating the public about policy options; that is,  democracy should be conjoined with a form of
‘aristocracy’ to form what Polybius characterized as a ‘mixed constitution’ (Polybius, 1979: Bk 4 – 10,
310).  And it is necessary for people to appreciate issues relevant to their  lives at a multitude of
spatial  and  temporal  scales,  extending  to  the  entire  globe  over  decades,  centuries  and  even
millennia. While achieving this will require innovative thinking about institutions, here I want to focus
more broadly on the cultural aspects of democracy that are required for democratic institutions.
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Democracy and Culture
As noted, the reaction against Hobbesian thought was associated not only with the affirmation of the
possibility of freedom but acknowledgement of the diversity of societies. This acknowledgement was
brought into focus and further  developed through the elaboration of the  notion of culture.  Hegel
synthesised these two components of anti-Hobbesian thought, conceiving the self-formation of spirit
as developing through the dialectic of recognition, the dialectic of representation and the dialectic of
labour  which,  while  being dependent upon each other,  are  irreducible  to  each other  (Habermas,
1973). The development of this notion of culture is associated with the appreciation that people create
themselves through culture,  that  they  become  human through being socialised into  a  particular
culture, but in doing so become free agents, developing the capacity to question and transform their
culture, either as individuals or collectively. The notion of culture corresponds to the Greek notion of
nomos, but incorporates much more into it. In the ancient Greek world, democracy was associated
with people taking responsibility for the creation and transformation of their  own nomos (that is,
being autonomous); in the modern world democracy requires that people take responsibility for the
preservation,  questioning,  transformation and creative advance of their  culture.  While Hobbesians
deny  the  notion  of  culture,  treating  their  conception  of  humans  as  egoists  as  the  natural  and
unalterable  state  of  affairs,  as  the  true  view  of  humans justified  by  the  natural  sciences,  their
opponents are concerned to show that this conception of humans and way of being is the product of
only  one  culture  among  others,  and  that  people  could  fundamentally  transform  themselves  by
transforming their culture, thereby creating a radically different form of society. For this reason they
should take responsibility for the form of society they live in whether they choose to preserve or
change it. Castoriadis’ argument is a development of this view, although he does not deploy the term
‘culture’ for this purpose.
Democracy  requires,  first  and foremost,  an education system that appreciates that humans only
become  free  agents  able  to  take  responsibility  for  their  community  and  society  and  participate
properly in its institutions through being educated, that is, ‘encultured’. An education system should
simultaneously enable people to master their cultural heritage, appreciate that they are culturally
formed and culture creating beings and should develop people’s capacity to actively participate in
maintaining,  questioning,  developing  and  transforming  their  culture,  including  their  institutions.
Inevitably, participation in the development and transformation of a culture, particularly where this is
associated with the development or transformation of institutions,  will involve power relations. To
understand the relationship between culture and power, especially as this relationship operates over
long durations, it is necessary to consider the nature of agency and of action and the relationship
between these and narratives.
As we saw, Schelling suggested a close relationship between narratives, the process of coming to
self-consciousness,  and agency  over  generations.  Such ideas have been defended and developed
much further by recent philosophers. It has been shown how people act according to how they define
reality,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  which characterization of  reality  they  take  to  be
legitimate,  and how it  is through stories that  definitions of  reality  are  elaborated,  promulgated,
evaluated, chosen and acted upon (Gare, 2002b)[4]  David Carr in particular has shown how all but
minor actions require of people that they tell a story of what they are doing in order to continue the
action after  interruptions,  to coordinate the actions of different people and to integrate particular
actions with broader actions and projects (Carr, 1991). Actions are lived stories. The more complex
the action, the longer its duration and the more people involved, the more obviously this is the case.
Actions such as building a community or developing our understanding of the cosmos can transcend
generations, and Carr showed the central importance of narratives to such actions. Institutions are
largely made up of patterns of symbolically organized actions crystallized and sustained as part of
such long-term complex actions. However, in crystallizing patterns of actions, institutions take on a
life  of  their  own and  become  objects  to  be  maintained,  questioned,  reformed,  transformed  or
redefined  in  relation to  other  institutions and  to  society’s  current  and  longer  term  projects.  To
continue  long  term  actions,  each  new  generation  must  be  educated  to  appreciate  the  stories
(histories) characterizing the purpose and development of these institutions, their roles within these
multi-generational actions and the arguments which have taken place over their purposes and roles in
order to be able to properly take on roles within them. Just as individual actions consist of a hierarchy
of smaller, component actions while being components of broader actions, stories are made up of
smaller, component stories while being parts of broader stories. People are born into social worlds
already constituted by stories, including stories of institutions, and must take a place within these; but
in taking up a place, they are put in a position where they can question and transform these stories,
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including the ultimate goals they project. That is, through stories people are recognized as subjects
and  are  thereby  ‘subjected’  by  the  logic  of  these  stories,  but  at  the  same  time  they  can  be
empowered to entertain or imagine alternative narrative emplotments with alternative visions of the
future and alternative ways of living, to configure the stories of their own lives and to participate in
refiguring,  thereby become the co-authors of,  these broader stories (Wood,  1991).  The stories of
particular  people  are  lived  out  in  a  world  of  unfolding  stories  of  different  durations,  ultimately
extending to the stories of nations, civilization and of humanity over centuries.
Democracy and Polyphonic Stories
By recognizing the storied nature of human action and of societies it becomes possible to consider the
kinds of stories required for democracy. To begin with, recognizing actions as stories focuses attention
on the way in which other beings enter into a story. In the Hobbesian model of action, beings other
than the actor, including other people, enter into the story of an action (or complex of actions) only as
the subordinates,  instruments or  obstacles for  realizing particular  ends.  They are objectified.  The
story of such an action, if it is explicitly articulated, is monologic, recounted from one, unquestioned
perspective. But stories can also involve appreciating others as co-becoming processes with their own
ends and stories might be questioned and reformulated to accord justice to all beings affected by such
stories.  Such reformulation requires a  place within these stories for  actors to question their  own
beliefs, to challenge each other’s beliefs and to reflect on and reformulate the stories they are living
out.  Such  reflection  can  involve  considerations  of  different  possible  paths  to  particular  ends,
questioning  the  ends  themselves  and  envisaging  alternative  ends,  or  questioning  of  the
interpretations of situations on which such judgements are based. Reflection on interpretations can
range  from questioning what is taken to be  the  case,  or  questioning the  interpretative  schemes
through which situations are interpreted. The participants in the action might be accorded different
degrees  of  recognition  as  potential  or  actual  participants  in  questioning  and  choosing  between
different versions of the stories in which they are participants. Where a high degree of recognition is
acknowledged, we have polyphonic stories, stories which take into account a diversity of perspectives
in dialogue and debate with each other, generating at the same time greater reflexivity and much
more  active  engagement  in  interpretation,  questioning,  conjecturing,  storytelling  and  choosing
between different  versions of stories by  the  participants in the  story  (Morson & Emerson,  1990:
231-268).
Democracy presupposes and requires polyphonic narratives. For a social order to be democratic there
must be appreciation of diverse perspectives, dialogue, questioning, telling and retelling of stories,
the generation of new conjectures about the nature of the world and new emplotments to interpret or
reformulate  the  stories we  are  living out  individually  and collectively,  and philosophies to  more
systematically  question,  develop and reformulate  and adjudicate  between conjectures about  and
interpretations of the world. In a democratic world order there would be a polyphonic grand narrative
giving a place to diverse people in diverse institutions, countries and regions with diverse interests
contemplating what kind of future they want. It would consist of people constrained to participate in
this narrative but would provide them with the means to question and reformulate the narratives of
the  institutions  within  which  they  are  participating,  their  communities,  their  societies  and  their
civilizations, and this grand narrative, and the means to promulgate their versions of these stories, to
debate with opposing versions and to participate in choosing between rival versions. The destruction
of democracy involves the imposition of a monologic narrative on society with very little place for
questioning the stories or interpretative schemes that people are socialized into and which they are
living out, and the disappearance or trivialization of philosophical questioning and speculation.
From Economics to Human Ecology
With this in mind we can now assess the relationship between neo-liberalism and democracy, and
consider what would be required to refurbish the traditional notion of democracy. Economic liberalism
is  the  effort  to  emancipate  the  market  from  societies throughout  the  world  and to  subordinate
societies to the laws of the market.  The first attempt led to the Great Depression,  to the rise of
Nazism and to the Second World War (Polanyi,  1957). Neo-liberals have revived this project,  and
their success could have even more disastrous consequences. Neo-liberalism privileges economics as
the core discourse on fundamental issues of domestic public policy,  a discourse that excludes the
general population as lacking expertise, and with an intolerance of cultural differences that resist the
market and support for the quest for new markets and new sources of cheap raw materials to stave
off economic stagnation,  it promotes an aggressive,  militarist foreign policy.  The ultimate end of
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civilization is economic growth through the technological domination of nature and of people and the
imposition of the market on every facet of life throughout the entire world. This is upheld not as one
possibility among others from which we should choose, but as the natural order of things. It involves
the  transformation  of  education  into  a  business  selling  a  service  promising  to  augment  the
marketability of people’s labour power and it reduces research to the development of technology to
generate profits. The cultural life essential for democracy, insofar as it is not reduced to an instrument
of production, is devalued and trivialized as entertainment. Neo-liberalism imposes a monologic grand
narrative that excludes questioning. Freedom is reduced to what are for most people the extremely
limited  choices  available  through  participation  in  the  market,  generally  without  the  knowledge
required to make even these choices. The inevitable concentration of wealth generated by the market
empowers a small, super-wealthy elite to manipulate how the market and political and legal systems
operate and, to a considerable extent, how and what most people think. In the mass media, history is
almost always interpreted from the perspective of the power elites. All questions about the ultimate
goals of society and civilization are taken off the agenda,  even when the dynamic of the market
threatens to destroy the ecological conditions for humanity’s survival.
Process metaphysics is important because it provides the basis not only for challenging the Hobbesian
tradition of thought on which neo-liberalism is based and upholding the possibility of democracy, but
also for upholding the significance of cultural life, particularly the importance of stories, required for
its functioning. It provides a perspective from which the past history of humanity and its intellectual
development can be questioned and reformulated, the present re-evaluated and a new vision of the
future projected. As metaphysics, it also provides the basis for organizing debates on political issues.
As Aristotle argued, debates on political issues are only likely to get anywhere when people can arrive
at  agreement  about  what  is  the  good life,  what  does it  mean to  be  human,  what  is  life,  and
ultimately,  what is  being.  Metaphysics makes all  such assumptions explicit  and thereby  open to
questioning in a systematic way, and process metaphysics, unlike Hobbesian metaphysics, provides a
place for and upholds the importance of such reflexivity. However, process metaphysics also provides
the foundation for new forms of human science.
At present, politics is dominated by economic theory either directly or through its influence on other
disciplines, notably political science. Efforts have been made to reformulate economics on different
assumptions about the nature of humans. However, to deal with the mammoth task of grappling with
the  global  ecological  crisis,  a  more  radical  solution is  called  for.  Economics,  with its  Hobbesian
assumptions, needs to be knocked off its pedestal and subordinated to a different kind of science able
to  construe  humans as autonomous participants in the  dynamics of nature  capable  of redefining
themselves, their place in the world, and their goals. At the beginning of this paper I referred to the
work  of  Stephen  Bunker.  Bunker  is  a  sociologist,  but  the  framework  he  used  to  analyse  the
environmentally  destructive  imperatives of  the  global  system  is  human ecology.  I  have  argued
elsewhere that while economics has its roots in the metaphysics of mechanistic materialism, human
ecology has its roots in the anti-mechanistic tradition of thought associated with Schelling (Gare,
2000a), that is, in the tradition of process metaphysics. It is implicitly anti-reductionist, holding not
only that nature has dynamics of its own that we must recognize, but that humans are themselves
culturally produced and culturally transforming agents, by their actions creating the future whether
they acknowledge this or not. Human ecology overcomes the division between the natural sciences,
the  human  sciences  and  the  humanities.  Recent  developments  in  ecology  incorporating  into  it
thermodynamics,  hierarchy  theory  and  complexity  theory  have  not  only  reinforced  its
anti-mechanistic heritage,  but also advanced its capacity  to analyse the relationship between the
dynamics of nature and the dynamics of human societies (Allen et. al., 2003). Hierarchy theory in
particular, characterizing the development of new levels of organization as involving new levels of
facilitative constraints is both in accordance with Schelling’s concept of evolution through the limiting
of activity and justifies the conception of humans as potentially creative participants within nature by
virtue of their capacity to develop their own constraints (Gare, 2000b). Incorporating such theories,
human ecology  has the  means to bring into focus,  analyse  and comprehend the complex  power
relations within and between societies. While economics implicitly upholds growth in the production of
commodities as the ultimate end, human ecology should explicitly uphold the quest for autonomy and
the  proper  recognition of  people  and nature  as its ends (thereby  leaving these  open to  further
questioning),  and  the  most  basic  end,  the  condition of  everything  else,  the  development  of  an
environmentally sustainable civilization. As a coordinating framework to rethink our future, to recast
our  grand narratives of  civilization,  human ecology  could provide  the  framework  for  democratic
societies, federated at multiple levels, to comprehend the world and to deliberate on the creation the
future. It could also provide the framework for thinking about what kind of institutions we should be
striving to create, institutions embodying and facilitating a commitment to autonomy, democracy and
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Notes
[1] This paper is based on the Douglas Lecture delivered at St Andrews University on July, 27, 2003 as part of the ‘Applied
Process Thought’ Conference organized by Dr Mark Dibben.
[2] ‘Liberal fascism’, a term originally proposed by H.G. Wells, is the best description of these ‘neo-conservatives’ who are
simultaneously promoting the market while addressing the fragmentation of society it engenders by promoting xenophobia
to achieve national unity.
[3] It is not necessary here to enter into the debate on how much the neo-conservatives were influenced by Schmitt’s
Hobbesian protégé Leo Strauss at Chicago University. If Strauss was influential, it was because his ideas accorded with the
metaphysical assumptions prevailing in Anglophone countries.
[4] Process philosophy as it has developed since Schelling provides an underpinning for understanding this central role of
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stories in human self-creation. Stories involve multiple levels of durational becoming (Bergson), semiosis (Peirce), the
dialectic of recognition (Mead), creative imagination (Castoriadis) and concrescence (Whitehead).
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